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Abstract 
 
Of late years there is considerable progress in the development of credit risk models. Revised 
Framework on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (2004) 
raised the standards of risk management on the new high level. At the same time the problem of 
theoretical investigation of probability of default time structure (and consequently maturity 
dependence of capital requirement, expected loss, etc.) rests actual. Basel Committee 
recommends to perform maturity adjustment in capital requirement. By its sense this adjustment 
is a penalty for exceeding one year maturity. However the direct procedure of receiving of 
proposed maturity adjustment rests undisclosed. 
In this article we propose a method of calculation of maturity adjustment directly from open 
data. In addition analytical expressions revealing probability of default time structure are 
received. The character of our results is close enough to Basel proposal. However it was 
discovered that for low probabilities of default (high ratings) and maturities of 2-3 year there 
may exist underestimation of risk capital up to 50%.   
 
Key words: Maturity adjustment, Capital Requirement, Basel II, Probability of default, PD time 
structure.  
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The unknown credit losses the bank will suffer can be represented by two components: expected 
loss (EL) and unexpected loss (UL). While a bank can forecast the average level of EL and 
manage them, UL are peak losses that exceed expected levels. Capital is needed to cover the 
risks of such peak losses, and therefore it has a loss-absorbing function. 
In June 2004, the Basel Committee issued a Revised Framework on International Convergence 
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (hereinafter Basel II) (see Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2004). In this document Basel II Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach 
was introduced. This approach is built on the following risk parameters: Probability of Default 
(PD), Loss Given Default (LGD) and Exposure at Default (EAD). 
Under advanced IRB (AIRB) approach, institutions are allowed to use their own internal models 
for base parameters of credit risk as primary inputs to the Capital Requirement (Capital at Risk 
or CAR) calculation. 
Banks generally employ a one-year planning horizon. The majority of well known portfolio 
models (CreditPortfolioView, CreditRisk+, CreditPortfolioManager, Credit Metrics, etc.) agree 
in fact, that the value of the credit portfolio is only observed with respect to a predefined time 
horizon (typically one year) that is consequently equals to time horizon in Basel II. In fact this 
time horizon generally does not correspond with the actual maturity of the loans in credit 
portfolio. It is obvious that long term loans are riskier. With respect to a three-year term loan, for 
example, the one-year horizon could mean that more than two-thirds of the credit risk is 
potentially ignored. So maturity becomes one of the important risk parameters and we need to 
make adjustment in PD and CAR to account this fact. Particularly, this is valid for Default Mode 
(DM) models like the one of Basel II. Basel Committee proposes maturity adjustment (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005), but there is no available detailed explication for this 
result. 
Thereby we consistently receive term structure of cumulative PD and maturity adjustment for 
capital requirement on base of open data published by rating ageneses and compare it with Basel 
II proposal. Our results are close to Basel II recommendation. They can make the process of 
economic capital allocation for long-term loans more clear. 
 
The topic of maturity effects is rater popular and widely discussed in recent literature. Number of 
authors worked on multi-horizon economic capital allocation on base of Mark to Market (MTM) 
paradigm (see Kalkbrener and Overbeck, 2002, Barco, 2004, Grundke, 2003). In these models 
changes in portfolio value are caused by changes in credit spreads which in their turn strongly 
depend on credit rating migration. Transition probabilities are normally assembled into the 
matrix form called a transition probability matrix. The transition probability matrix is convenient 
for describing the behavior of a Markov chain because multi-step transition probabilities are 
easily obtained. Though the Markov assumption for PD time dependence is not proved there is 
much extant literature and many texts on Markov chains and their applications for maturity 
effects (see, for example, Jarrow et al., 1997, Inamura, 2006, Frydman & Schuermann, 2005). 
One of the latest works is the article by Bluhm &Overbeck (2007) where Markov assumption is 
not rejected but is adopted by dropping the homogeneity assumption with Non-Homogeneity 
Continuous-Time Markov Chains (NHCTMCs). 
For models on base of DM paradigm there exists few literature analyzing account of long risk 
horizons. For example, Gurtler and Heithecker (2005) propose two approaches (“Capital for One 
Period” and “Capital to Maturity”) to calculate economic capital adjustment on base of rating 
ageneses data and also compare it with Basel Committee recommendations.  
 
Capital Requirement Calculation 
The Basel Risk Weight Functions used for the derivation of supervisory capital charges for UL 
are based on a specific model developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2005). In the bottom of this model lie the results of Merton (1974) and Vasicek (2002).   4 
Assume that a loan defaults if the value of the borrower's assets at the loan maturity T falls below 
the contractual value  B  of its obligations payable. Let A  be the value of borrower’s assets, 
described by the process: 
  dAAdtAdx ms =+ 
were asset value at  T can be represented as: 
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where X is a standard normal variable. The probability of default on risk horizon T  ( ) T PD  is 
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( ) N  is a cumulative normal distribution function. 
The variable X is standard normal, and can therefore be represented as 
  1 XYZ rr =+-  
where  Y,  Z  are mutually independent standard normal variables. The variable  Y  can be 
interpreted as a common factor, such as an economic index, over the interval (0, T). Then  r  
represents correlation of a borrower with state of the economy. The term Y r  is the company’s 
exposure to the common factor and the term  1 i Z r -  represents the company specific risk. 
We will evaluate the probability of default as the expectation over the common factor Y of the 
conditional probability given Y. This can be interpreted as assuming various scenarios for the 
economy, determining the probability of default under each scenario, and then weighting each 
scenario by its likelihood. 
When the common factor is fixed, the conditional probability of default ( ) pd  is 
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The quantity  pd(Y) provides the company default probability under the given scenario. The 
unconditional default probability  PDT  is the average of the conditional probabilities over the 
scenarios. 
So we have the worst scenario when the common factor takes the worst magnitude. Y  is a 
standard normal variable, so this magnitude is given by  ( )
1 N a
- -  with some confidence level α 
(Basel Committee recommends  0.999 a = ). Then the worst conditional probability of default is 
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Under this worst scenario we will have the most serious loss and the capital requirement for a 
loan (worst loss – expected loss) is then given by    5 
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Or in a compact form 
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Figure 1 illustrates the dependence of capital requirement on probability of default for one year 
maturity. . 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Basel Maturity Adjustment 
Basel II capital requirement formula includes a component responsible for maturity (maturity 
adjustment). It is noted that this adjustment follows from the regression of the output of the 
KMV Portfolio Manager
TM
.. 
Maturity adjustment is linear, changes for maturities from 1 to 5 years and has the following 
from: 
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where  PD  is one-year probability of default. 
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the dependence of Basel II maturity adjustment on one-year 
probability of default for fixed maturity and on maturity for fixed one-year PD consequently. 
 
[Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
 
 
PD time structure 
From cumulative default rates published by major rating agencies, such as Fitch Ratings (2006), 
Moody’s (2006), Standard & Poor’s (2007) directly follows that probability of default increases 
with the increase of risk horizon (Table 1, Figure 4). So we need to perform an adjustment in 
one-year PD if we want to take into account maturity longer than a year. Consequently we have 
to make adjustments in capital requirement working with such maturities. This adjustment is 
equivalent to a penalty for excess of one-year risk horizon.  
In this article we based on the statistical data provided by Moody’s (2006) (see Table 1). 
 
[Table 1 and Figure 3 about here] 
 
There are some potential errors in this data (see Credit Metrics
TM Technical  Document, 1997): 
•  Output cumulative default likelihoods violate proper rank order. For instance, presented 
table shows that AAAs have defaulted more often at the 10-year horizon than have AAs. 
This is true also for B1 and Ba3 ratings. 
•  Limited historical observation yields “granularity” in estimates. For instance, the AAA 
row in the table is supported by limited firm-years worth of observation. In 1997 it was   6 
only 1,658 firm-years.  This is enough to yield a “resolution” of 0.06% (i.e., only 
probabilities in increments of 0.06% – or 1/1658 – are possible). 
This lack of resolution may erroneously suggest that some probabilities are identically zero. For 
instance, if there were truly a 0.01% chance of AAA default, then we would have to watch about 
for another 80 years before there would be a 50% chance of tabulating a non-zero AAA default 
probability. 
 
In spite of these slight errors we suppose that presented statistical data reflects rather well the 
time structure of probability of default except, probably, several first ratings for the reasons 
mentioned earlier. 
 
Firstly we fit Moody’s cumulative probabilities for every rating  n with 3 parameters 
( , n PD , n a n b ) special function: 
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Fitting function was chosen to satisfy several essential properties: 
•  For the maturity of one year parameter  n PD  is equivalent to one year probability of 
default taken in percents 
•  For zero maturity  T PD  equals zero 
•  Function have an asymptotic for large terms (parameter  n a   should be grater than  n b ). 
This property follows from the notion that with time companies either default rather fast 
or attain higher ratings. So with time we have some kind of stabilization. 
•  Function have a change in convexity (for low probabilities of default we have concavity, 
for high - salience). This property follows from notion that companies with high rating 
pass several lower ratings before default. So there exist some initial period where 
cumulative probability of default doesn’t grow very fast (concavity). Companies with 
low ratings can come to default rather fast so we can’t observe such effect and 
cumulative probability of default grows immediately (salience).   
Of cause, proposed function is not unique, but it shows very good fitting results (see Table 2 and 
Figure 4). 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
In the Table 2 the set of received data is presented: 3 parameters for every rating, one-year 
probabilities of default corresponding to ratings. R-square shows that proposed function 
precisely takes into account particularities of used data. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Heretofore we used probabilities of default which correspond to discrete ratings. But PD is 
continuous by its nature. So we need to pass from discrete ratings (and corresponding one-year 
PDs) to continuous default probabilities. 
 
To do that we smoothed the PDn parameter, which has the sense of one year probability of 
default. Linear dependence was established between numeric ratings and natural logarithm of 
PDn (see Figure 5). Quality of this approximation is rather high: R square equals 0.974. 
  ( ) ( ) Ratingexp0.561Numeric Rating6.307, PDA =￿-  (4)   7 
where PDA is approximation for PDn parameter. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
To receive continuous dependency of cumulative default probabilities from one-year PD and 
maturity we also need to smooth other two parameter (a, n n b ). From the analysis of dependence 
of parameters on PDA the following two fitting functions were proposed: 
a f depends on two parameters ( a a  and  a b ): 
( ) ()exp aaa fxx ab =￿￿  
b f  depends on three parameters ( b a ,  b b ,  b g ): 
( ) ( )
2
()exp bbbb fxx abg =￿-￿+ . 
Approximation a, b of parameters an  and  n b  gives the following results: 
  ( ) ( ) 0.080exp0.639ln(100) aaPDPD ==￿￿￿  (5) 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1.278exp0.293ln1000.938. bbPDPD ==￿-￿￿-  (6) 
Constraint on a and b (a have to be grater then b ) is fulfilled. 
From (3), (5) and (6) follows the formula which gives probability of default (PDT) for every 
one-year default probability (PD) and maturity (T in years) (see Figure 6): 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,,,. T PDFPDaPDbPDT =  (7) 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
 
Maturity Adjustment 
Now, when the dependence of probability of default PDT for every maturity is known we can 
construct maturity adjustment for capital requirement in a following way: 
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where  T PD  is calculated from (5). 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
Maturity adjustment does not depend strongly on correlation coefficient r  (see Figure 7). For 
example, it can be taken in from proposed in Basel II: 
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Dependence of maturity adjustment on confidence level a  is rather strong, particularly for low 
probabilities of default (see Figure 8). But under Basel Committee recommendation we work 
with high confidence levels ( 0.999 a =  or even  0.9999 a = ). 
 
[Figure 8 about here]   8 
 
Figure 9 illustrates received maturity adjustment and Basel II maturity adjustment for several 
maturities, so it is possible to compare them. 
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
Though the character of maturity adjustments is close enough, there is a difference in Basel II 
proposal and our results (see Figure 9). Received adjustment is higher for small probabilities of 
default (high ratings) and for maturities about 2, 3 years. It also reduces faster with the increase 
of one-year PD. Higher level of adjustment for high ratings is partly explainable and follows 
from the dependence of capital requirement on default probability (see Figure 1). For small 
probabilities the slope of the curve is grater then for large probabilities, so the same change in 
probability (with time) gives the greater change in capital requirement. But at the moment there 
is no complete explanation of difference between these two adjustments. If we had more exact 
information about methodology and data used for Basel II maturity adjustment it seems to us to 
be possible to explain other disagreements. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this article the dependence of default probability on time was continuously parameterized 
using data provided by Moody’s. This approach gives results expressed analytically. It 
corresponds well with statistical data. Time structure of PD allows to receive maturity 
adjustment (or penalty for excess of one year maturity) for capital requirement.  
It was shown that the character of Basel II AIRB approach maturity adjustment function can be 
explained rather well from open statistical data.  
However from received results follows that there exist possible underestimate of risk fixed by 
Basel II maturity adjustment function. It is shown that penalty is higher for assets with good 
rating (investment grade) and maturities about 2 years. So that possible underestimate may be up 
to 50%.  
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Table 1. Example of average cumulative corporate defaults rates for several ratings/years 
Rating  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  …  Year 16  Year 17  Year 18  Year 19  Year 20 
Aaa  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.039  …  0.208  0.208  0.208  0.208  0.208 
Aa1  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.110  …  0.941  0.941  0.941  0.941  0.941 
Aa2  0.000  0.011  0.048  0.120  …  0.970  1.177  1.414  1.684  1.710 
…  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  … 
B1  3.223  8.503  13.573  17.635  …  32.161  32.161  32.161  32.161  32.161 
B2  5.457  12.067  17.141  21.057  …  29.598  29.680  29.756  29.756  29.756 
B3  10.460  18.653  25.249  29.887  …  38.964  38.964  38.985  38.985  38.985 
Caa-C  20.982  30.274  36.115  39.500  …  43.326  43.326  43.326  43.326  43.326 
Note: see Moody's (2006), Exhibit 36 
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Table 2. Fitting results 
Alphanumeric 
Rating  
Numeric 
Rating 
PD one-
year, %  PDn  a  b 
 
R
2 
Aaa  1  0.000  0.000  0,364  0,404  0.915 
Aa1  2  0.000  0.000  0,012  0,019  0.899 
Aa2  3  0.000  0.027  0,000  0,006  0.975 
Aa3  4  0.019  0.010  0,019  0,030  0.983 
A1  5  0.003  0.033  0,040  0,060  0.970 
A2  6  0.026  0.112  0,000  0,004  0.965 
A3  7  0.037  0.063  0,000  0,016  0.951 
Baa1  8  0.166  0.230  0,002  0,002  0.978 
Baa2  9  0.161  0.157  0,041  0,252  0.998 
Baa3  10  0.335  0.538  0,103  0,584  0.993 
Ba1  11  0.753  1.072  0,084  1,106  0.996 
Ba2  12  0.780  1.472  0,101  0,714  0.995 
Ba3  13  2.069  4.117  0,162  0,762  0.986 
B1  14  3.223  5.928  0,209  0,864  0.978 
B2  15  5.457  7.325  0,297  1,252  0.992 
B3  16  10.460  11.430  0,355  1,226  0.996 
Caa-C  17  20.982  19.970  0,619  0,619  0.998 
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Figure 1. Dependence of Basel II capital requirement
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Figure 9. Comparison of recieved maturity adjustment (black curves) with
Basel II maturity adjustment (grey curves) for several maturities.
a. Maturity 2 years b. Maturity 3 years
c. Maturity 4 years d. Maturity 5 years